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MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE
oF-EVIDENCE
OF-INSTRUCTIONS IN-Wold vs. City of Boulder-No. 12705-Decided May 9, 1932

-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Verdict of the jury, when based upon disputed evidence, will not
be disturbed unless wrong beyond question.
2. The exclusion of photographs as evidence is not prejudicial, when
they merely tend to show what has already been established by other evidence
beyond question.
3. In a suit against the municipality, to recover damage for falling on
an icy sidewalk, the testimony of a witness for the defendant, that he had
never seen ice formed at the place in question is admissible, when the plaintiff's witnesses have already made contrary statements.
4. Municipal corporation is not primarily liable for injuries suffered
by a pedestrian because of a defect on the sidewalk. The liability of a city
arises, if at all, only after it has had reasonable time, after acquiring or being
charged, with knowledge of the defect, to remedy it. An instruction to this
effect is not error. Evidence of absence of complaints concerning such defects
is therefore admissible.
5. An instruction limiting the cause of action to the negligence alleged
in the complaint, is not error.-Judgment affirmed.

OF COURTS TO GRANT-Laizure v. Judge of
County Court of Pueblo County-No. 13094-Decided May 9, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. When in a divorce action the plaintiff, after obtaining her findings
of fact and conclusions of law, has applied to set them aside and dismiss the
suit and the court refuses to do so; and when after the expiration of six
months, the defendant applies for a decree of divorce and the court has refused
his application, application for a writ of mandamus should be made to the
district court, unless it appears that there is reason to apply to the supreme
court.
2. For purposes of mandamus, the district court is a superior tribunal
to the county court.
3. The mere fact that the county and district courts have jurisdiction
to grant divorces does not prevent the county court from being an inferior
court. The two courts have concurrent jurisdiction only where the plaintiff
seeks alimony in excess of $2,000.00. Under the present system, appeal from
the county to the district court may be had and there is no reason to distinguish
between divorce cases and other cases.-Petition denied.
MANDAMUS-JURISDICTION
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DICTA

STARE DEcIsis-CraddockEstate v. Palmer-No. 13099-Decided May 16,

1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

1. Where, after entry of finding of fact in divorce case, but before
final decree, the wife dies, and the District Court after expiration of six
months entered a final decree finding that cause of action survived and decreeing that husband had no right, title or interest in any property left by the
deceased wife and such judgment is affirmed by this court, it became the law
of the case.
2. The husband cannot thereafter attempt to re-litigate such issue by
filing a petition for determination of heirship in County Court and on a
judgment adverse to his alleged right as an heir, sue out writ of error in this
Court and re-litigate the same question by merely bringing a different action.
-Judgment

affirmed.

BON--In the Matter of the Assignment of Albert
H. Stockham, et al. v. Jack, as Receiver-No. 12898-Decided May 16,
1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.

ESTOPPEL-LIABILITY ON

1. Where the President of a bank signed as surety the bond of the
ckshier of the same bank in 1917, and the Cashier in 1922 was elected Vice
President in which office he remained until 1927 when he was again elected
cashier and between 1922 and 1929 a shortage occurred in his accounts in
excess of the penalty in the bond, and thereafter the President made an
assignment for the benefit of creditors and the bank went into Receivership,
and Receiver filed claim with assignee of President for full penalty of bond,
order allowing claim in full was not error.
2. Where in 1929 the bank examiner, before the bank failed, objected
to the bond and the President assured him it was good and in full force and
effect, the assignee of the President is estopped from setting up the defense
that the bond had expired in 1922 by the Cashier's vacating his office and being
elected Vice President.-Judgmentaffirmed.

DEEDS-CONVEYANCE

FOR SUPPORT DURING LIFE---GROUNDS FOR SET-

TING ASIDE-Potter, et al. v. Coombs, et al.-No. 13079-Decided May
16, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Where a woman 65 years of age conveys her farm worth $30,000
to her physician and confidential adviser for a consideration of his paying to
her annually during the rest of her life $1,800, she reserving a life estate
therein, and further providing that upon failure to make any required payments, the doctor should reconvey the property and forfeit as liquidated damages and as rental, all payments, theretofore made, a failure to make the
annual payment for two successive years or to pay the taxes work a forfeiture
of the deed and a decree providing for payment of the balance due up to the
death of the grantor or for a reconveyance of the real estate, was proper.
2. In such a case it is not necessary to allege or prove fraud.
3. Failure to perform the stipulation for support is a sufficient ground
for setting aside the deed without any showing of fraud.-Judgment affirmed.

DICTA
CARRIERS-JURISDICTION

OF

PUBLIC

UTILITIES

COMMISSION-COMMON

CARRIERs-Burbridge vs. The Public Utilities Commission-No. 12906-Decided May 23, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.

1. The court below affirmed the findings and order of the Public
Utilities Commission, which found that Burbridge was a motor vehicle, or
common carrier, operating without a certificate of public convenience and
necessity and further ordered him to cease and desist from operating as a
motor vehicle carrier unless he shall have obtained a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.
2. The Statutes of Colorado define motor vehicle carrier as one who,
among other things, indiscriminately accepts, discharges and lays down either
passengers, freight, or express, or who holds himself out for such purpose by
advertising or otherwise.
3. The evidence shows that Burbridge operated four trucks transporting freight between Denver, Greeley, Brighton, and Eaton, under contract,
either oral or written, for six business firms and in addition to this, accepted
freight from numerous shippers upon the request of the six firms that he contracted with, which freight was delivered to the various branches of the said
six firms that he was under contract with.
4. Such evidence fails to show that Burbridge did indiscriminately
accept, discharge, and lay down, freight or that he held himself out for such
purpose by advertising or otherwise.
5. Chapter 134 Session Laws 1927 was not intended to and does not
regulate private motor vehicle carriers for hire. It regulates only common
carriers engaged in the business of transporting by motor vehicle passengers,
freight or express, for hire.
6. Burbridge was not, therefore, a common carrier as defined by the
act.-Judgment reversed.
ATTORNEY

AND

CLIENT-PRINCIPAL

AND

AGENT-LOANS-PRINCIPAL'S

Loss-Hentzell vs. Hildebrandet al.-No. 13072-Decided May 23, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.

1. Hildebrand obtained a judgment below against Hentzell cancelling
a promissory note and deed of trust. Mitchell, a lawyer, from time to time,
sold secured notes to Hentzell and Hentzell loaned money through Mitchell
as his attorney and agent, Mitchell examining the abstract of title and attending to the drawing of the papers. As a result, Mitchell became indebted to
Hentzell for $1200.00. Hildebrand applied to Mitchell for a loan of
$3000.00. The land being encumbered by a federal loan of $1800.00,
Mitchell submitted the application to Hentzell, who told Mitchell that he
would make the loan provided the title was all right and that Mitchell would
repay the $1200.00 to Hentzell or pay that amount to the Hildebrands as part
of the loan. The federal loan was to be paid out of the $3000.00. Mitchell
obtained Hildebrands' note for $3000.00 and their deed of trust, and for the
purpose of paying off the federal loan, Hentzell gave Mitchell sufficient,
together with the $1200.00 owing by Mitchell to pay off the federal loan.

DICTA
Mitchell did not pay off the loan, converted the money to his own use, and
paid nothing to the Hildebrands.
2. The trial court was right in holding that Mitchell was Hentzell's
agent in the transaction and that under the circumstances above that Hentzell
and not the Hildebrands should bear the loss.
3. Judgment cancelling the note and deed of trust is justified by the'
evidence and the law.-Judgment affirmed.

APPEAL AND ERROR-UNLAWFUL
RENT ON APPEAL-Routen vs.

DETAINER-NECESSITY

OF DEPOSITING

J. & 0. Ranch Company-No. 13087Decided May 23, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.

1. In an unlawful detainer action before a justice of the peace, the
J & 0 Ranch Company obtained judgment against Routen for possession of
land. Appeal was taken to the County Court. The two bonds were filed
and J & 0 Ranch Company filed motion to dismiss the appeal because of
Routen's failure to deposit rent, and the appeal was dismissed.
2. Upon an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace in an
unlawful detainer action founded upon non-payment of rent, the statute
requires the defendant to file two bonds and also deposit with the justice of
the peace the amount of rent found due and thereafter, upon appeal, the rent
must be deposited with the Clerk of the appellate court as and when due.
3. Such provision in regard to the deposit of rent is not applicable
where the rent was not payable in money, but was payable in one half of
products from all livestock, including poultry. In such case it cannot be
seriously contended that during the pendency of appeal the tenant should
deliver either to the justice of the peace or the clerk of the appellate court
livestock, poultry, eggs and other products from the rented premises.-Judgment reversed with directions to set aside judgment of dismissal and re-instate
the case on appeal.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL FOR NEGLIGENCE, IN HANDLING LOAN-The Colorado Investment and Realty Com-

pany vs. Stubbs-No. 12422-Decided May 23, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.

1. Where defendant is engaged in making farm loans and in buying
and selling farm loans and the plaintiff was an investing customer, and in
1922, sold a $5,000. loan to plaintiff, secured by a first deed of trust due in
five years; and where the defendant undertook to handle the collection of
interest and see that the taxes were kept up and where -it appeared that the
maker of the loan defaulted in the interest for several years and defaulted in
the payment of taxes during the entire period and the defendant failed to
inform the plaintiff of these facts, but assured the plaintiff during the period
from 1922 to 1926 that they were attending to the matter and that the payments were being promptly made of interest and taxes and did not disclose
the true situation to the plaintiff until four years after the loan was made,
at which time the security was so depreciated that the loan was valueless, the

DICTA
plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant the full principal of the

note and unpaid interest.
2. It is no defense to such an action that at most the defendant's
failure to advise plaintiff promptly of the defaults operated only to postpone

action and that there was no certainty that with knowledge the plaintiff would
have proceeded at once to foreclose or take other steps to protect his interests.
3. From the inception of plaintiff's ownership of the note, defendant
was his agent expressly charged and impliedly required to keep its principal
informed as to any circumstances coming to its knowledge calculated in
reasonable prospect to impair the security for the loan.
4. The question is not what the plaintiff would have done, but rather,
what he could have done had his agent been faithful.
5. The measure of damages was the full face of the note and interest.
Clearly the agent was negligent in matters essentially material; but for the

agent's derelictions, plaintiff would have been in position to protect his investment. In such circumstances, the amount of the claim is the proper
measure of damages.-Judgment affirmed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--LIABILITY FOR FALLING ON Icy SIDEWALKCONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-City and County of Denver vs. HudsonNo. 12664-Decided May 23, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Plaintiff below had judgment against the city for damages in the
sum of $1650. sustained by falling on an icy and slippery sidewalk. The
defendant urged error in that the evidence of the plaintiff showed as a matter
of law that she was guilty of contributory negligence in going upon an obviously dangerous sidewalk having at the time knowledge of its dangerous
condition and also knowledge of one or more other safe and convenient ways
by which the dangerous condition of the sidewalk on which she slipped and
fell could have been avoided; and that her failure to use the safe way or ways,
of which she knew, and her choice of a way she knew to be unsafe, constituted
the sole and proximate cause of her injuries.
2. If the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff had knowledge
of the unsafe condition of the sidewalk in question and that the adjoining
street or sidewalk afforded a safe and suitable way for travel, plaintiff might
be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
3. But, where there is testimony by the plaintiff that on the night
previous to the injury several inches of snow had fallen upon and still covered
the sidewalk in question and also the adjacent street and sidewalk which
tended to show that not only the sidewalk on which plaintiff fell, but also
the adjoining street, itself, and the sidewalk on the opposite side of the street
were also in a bad condition by reason of the snow and ice, the plaintiff cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in choosing
the particular walk that she traveled on.
4. Reasonable minds might differ as to the question of the plaintiff's
contributory negligence; hence, the trial court was right in submitting this
issue to the jury.-Judgment affirmed.
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SALES-WARRANTY-WAIVER

OF

WARRANTY-BY

EXTENDING

NOTE-

Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. vs. Miller-No. 12642-Decided
May 31, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Plaintiff sued on promissory notes. Defendants admitted execution
and delivery, but alleged they were part of purchase price of tractor, which
defendants were induced to purchase through false representations as to its
efficient usability. Alleged failure consideration and in a counter claim recovered in the court below the amount of note defendants had previously paid
on the purchase price.
2. Under such circumstances, plaintiff cannot rely upon a provision of
the written contract to purchase providing that all claims for damages by
reason of non-performance of the machinery are waived. The court will not
construe such a contract so as to work a forfeiture of rights except in very
clear cases.
3. The judgment of the court below in favor of the defendant on the
counter claim was grounded on the warranty that the tractor was well made,
of good material and would do as good work as any other machine under
like circumstances. The evidence was clear that the tractor did not comply
with this warranty.
4. The rule that in case of rescission it is the duty of the party to
return the tractor at the place where it was originally delivered does not obtain
where the defendant offered to return the tractor and demanded surrender of
their notes and the defendant refused such offer and demand. Under such
circumstances, actual delivery would be useless and the law does not require
useless or unnecessary things.
5. While ordinarily the renewal of a note after knowledge of defects
in the machine would estop defendants from defending on account of breaches
of warranty, yet in this case, there is no implication of law that the parties
were attempting to adjust past differences or to shut off defenses arising out
of past complaints, but that the transaction is to be understood merely as
extending the time in which each of the parties is to perform his contract.
The plaintiff's breach of warranty was not unconditionally consummated at
the time the renewal note was given, for the reason that the warranty and
the concurrent promise on the part of the plaintiff was not merely that there
would be no defects, but if there were defects, the plaintiff would remedy
them.-Judgment affirmed.
ATTORNEYS -

DISBARRMENT - GROUNDS OF - People vs. Warren No.
12652-Decided May 31, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. Where the evidence shows that an attorney makes collections without authority and appropriates the money to his own use, and by false and
fraudulent pretenses, induces one to cash a worthless check for him and gives
check for clothing on a bank where he has no funds, and is later convicted of
forgery, such a series of crimes shows that he is utterly unfit to engage in the
practice of law.

2.

In view of the record in this case, respondent is disbarred.
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Vincent vs. Martin - No.
WAIVER OF WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE 12763-Decided May 31, 1932- Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Vincent prosecutes error to review order of the County Court disallowing her claim for widow's allowance. It appears that during his lifetime,
Vincent and his wife entered into a contract providing that he would will and
bequeath to his wife the sum of $15,000.00 and all furniture and household
goods and in consideration thereof, she agreed to accept the same in full satisfaction of any and all rights of dower, statutory allowances and rights of
inheritance as surviving widow. Pursuant to this contract, will was executed
by Vincent with the written approval and acceptance of the terms by the wife.
2. There was no failure of consideration. Neither fraud nor undue
influence was charged or proven.
3. The words used in the contract "statutory allowances" was intended
to and did include the widow's allowance.
4. While the waiver of a widow's allowance must be express, this does
not mean that the words "widow's allowance" must be used in the waiver
where the term used in the waiver clearly comprehends that it includes
"widow's allowance."-Judgment affirmed.
WILLS -

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION-HOME

RULE

CITY-POLICE

COURT-CREA-

oF-The People vs. Pickens-No. 13035--Decided May 31, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
I.
The power provided by Charter for the Mayor to appoint two Justices
of the Peace, one of whom shall be designated to perform the duties of Police
Magistrate, does not negative the power of the council to create a Municipal
Court. No exclusive jurisdiction is conferred by the Charter, and the power
to so appoint and designate Justices rests upon the same constitutional grant
as the power to create the office here in dispute.
II.
A Municipal Court need not be established by charter provision. It can
be created by ordinance.-Judgment affirmed.
TION

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-KNOWLEDGE-RATIFICATION-FINDINGS

OF FACT

-Zang
Company vs. Reilly-No. 12686-Decided May 31, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
I.
Assuming that a mere secretary of a corporation is not invested with
authority to enter into contracts of general employment, nevertheless, when
such a secretary assumes to have such power and, to the knowledge of a Board
of Directors of a corporation, exercises it in making such contracts, the contract will be upheld as being that of the principal corporation.
II.
The findings of fact by a jury, when supported by evidence, will be
sustained.-Judgment affirmed.
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BODY JUDGMENTS-LIABILITY OF
DUCT APPLIED TO-Hershey, et

AUTHORITIES-CAS,

OF-GOOD

CON-

al, vs. The People ex rel Johnson-No.
13077-Decided May 31, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
I.

One confined under a body execution on a judgment recovered in a
tort action is not "sentenced" for a crime, and the provisions of the statute
allowing prisoners sentenced for crimes time off for good behavior does not
apply in such a case.
II.
Under the common law which applies in Colorado in absence of
statute if an officer who has a prisoner in charge, permits a voluntary or negligent escape the execution creditor may recover the damages actually sustained. The presumption is that the creditor loses the entire debt by such an
escape but the poverty or insolvency of the debtor can be introduced in
mitigation of damages.
III.
Where an officer has in his custody a man confined under a body execution and releases him under the advice of the Attorney General and the
City Attorney, such a release does not relieve the officer from liability. Under
such circumstances, the escape is deemed a negligent escape.
IV.
Under such circumstances as outlined above, the execution creditor is
entitled to recover whatever damages he has sustained as the result of the
wrongful release. Prima facie the amount of his damage is the amount of his
judgment against the confined debtor. The defending officers are, however,
entitled to prove, if they can, the execution debtor's poverty or insolvency in
mitigation of damages. It is error to exclude such proof.-Judgment reversed
and remanded.

PUBLIC UTILITIES-CITY ORDINANCES AFFECTING-ORDINANCES-INTER-

PRETATION oF--Canon City vs. Kaughman-No. 12688-Decided June

6, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
I.
An ordinance, providing that the right to operate an automobile or
other conveyance for hire in the city in any of the parks, over any roads or
highways owned or controlled by the city shall be licensed and subject to
licenses issued by the City Council, does not affect a vehicle operating under
a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity when it is shown that business was
not solicited or accepted in the city that passed the ordinance.
II.
It is unnecessary to determine as to whether or not a public utility may
be required to procure a license from a municipality under the facts of this
case.-Judgment affirmed.

DICTA
CONTRACTS-FRAUD-INCEPTION

OF-RATIFICATION-Duke

vs. Cregan-

No. 12601-Decided June 6, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.

I.
Plaintiff was induced to purchase an interest in the Sage Transfer and
Storage Company upon representations that the business made certain profits
during several prior years. As a matter of fact, the figures given as profits
included bad debts. In addition to this, the amount shown as having been
paid for rent was inflated considerably over the actual amount paid. A provision in the contract set out that the purchaser was acting not as the result
of his own investigation but in reliance upon the representations of the sellers.
Where the Court below found that the purchaser actually bought in reliance
upon the representations of the seller and that finding is supported by the
evidence, it will not be disturbed in the higher Court.
II.
A contention that the plaintiff, by accepting his salary from the company, affirmed the contract is unsound and the plaintiff is not required to
return the salary for it was received from the company and not from the
defendants. The lower Court found that the plaintiff received his salary
before he knew of the falsity of the representations made to him.-Judgment
affirmed.
INSURANCE-LABOR

UNIONS-PREMIUMS-EFFECT

OF DELINQUENCY

IN

PAYING-Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees vs. NolanNo. 12505-Decided June 6, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.

I.
Where, by a course of dealing, a company or organization, such as the
one in question, has led a member to believe and understand that prompt
payment of assessments will not be required but that they will be accepted
and received after due and that the member will be considered in good standing notwithstanding the delay in payment, the company will be held to have
waived prompt payment and the member will be deemed to be in good standing for such reasonable time after an assessment is delinquent as has theretofore customarily keen allowed him in which to pay dues.

II.
Where it is established that an insurance society accepted payment of
premiums after the insured was in default and that it was aware of such
default, a waiver is established.
III.
Where dues or premiums, payable on November 1, were not paid
until November 22, but at that time were received without question, the
company will be deemed to have waived its requirement for prompt payment.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Butler dissenting: The law set down in the majority
opinion is correct but not applicable to the facts in hand. The company here
involved was not an insurance company but a trade union. Its receipts are
not premiums but dues. The dues are paid for membership and, according to
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the by-laws, if they are paid promptly, certain death benefits are payable.
The death benefits are an inducement to prompt payment but are by no means
the sole purpose of the dues. The judgment should be reversed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DURATION

OF DISABILITY-Industrial Com-

mission vs. Roper-No. 13003-Decided June 6, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Alter.

I.

A finding by the referee for the Industrial Commission, sustained by
a supplemental award of the Commission to the effect that a caimant's disability has terminated, must be supported by the evidence and, upon an action
in the District Court to set aside an award of the Commission, it is the duty
of the Court to set aside such a finding where the record discloses no supporting testimony.
II.
Under rule 2, Rules of Procedure of the Colorado Industrial Commission, the Court determined the duration of the disability. This rule must
be pled. This was not done here.-The judgment of the District Court is
affirmed except as to the finding concerning the duration of disability.

MANDAMUS-POLICE

POWER-LEGISLATIVE

CONTROL

OF

HOME

RULE

CiTIEs-People, ex rel. Hershey vs. Begole-No. 12650--Decided June
20, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Refusal of the auditor of the City and County of Denver to
approve a demand, on the ground of want of lawful authority to approve it,
amounts to a' refusal to act upon it. Mandamus is the proper remedy to
compel an audit.
2. Act of 1907 (S. L. 1907, c. 112; C. L. c. 29), establishing registration districts for vital statistics and imposing upon the city or county in
which a registration district is situated, after approval by the auditing official
of such city or county, liability for the compensation of the local registrar, is
a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
3. Article XX of the state constitution imposes no limitation upon
the power of the legislature to control "home rule" cities in matters of public,
as distinguished from matters of local, nature.-Judgment reversed with
instructions.
IRRIGATION DISTRICTS-DISSOLUTION-BoNDS-INTEREST

AFTER MATURI-

TY-Clint 0. Heath vs. The Green City Irrigation District-No. 12839-

Decided June 20, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Where the owner of irrigation bonds was tendered by the County
Treasurer of Weld County, the full face value of his bonds, with interest
thereon, to maturity, he is not in a position to question the validity of a dis-

DICTA
solution decree of the District Court in which all the other creditors of the
District who were parties to this proceeding, have acquiesced.
2. The bondholder is not entitled to interest upon the same after
maturity or interest upon the attached coupons which accrued thereafter.Judgment affirmed.
LIABILITY OF OFFICER-MISREPRESENTATION EviDENCE-Hollis vs. Commercial National Bank-No. 12714-Decided
June 20, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

NOTES-IINDIVIDUAL

1.

In an action on a note by the bank against the president of a Com-

pany in his individual capacity, alleging misrepresentation, and where the only
evidence of misrepresentation is a letter that was not produced at the trial,
held error to introduce secondary evidence, without first showing that the
letter was directed to the bank; that the president of the bank, in whose
custody the letter was given, could not be found; or that any effort was made
to find him, what he knew or what disposition was made of the letter.Judgment reversed and remanded.

LIFE INSURANCE-AMBIGUITY

OF TERMS

OF POLICY-CONSTRUCTION-

Shinall vs. PrudentialInsurance Co.-No. 12776-Decided June 20, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

The date of the policy and the date for payment of annual premiums
was March 21. The first premium was not paid until April 21st. The
insured allowed the next annual premium, supposedly due March 21, to lapse,
and died June 4th. The insurance company contended that the sixty days
of grace had expired before the death of the insured. The application, which
constituted a part of the contract, provided that the policy should not take
effect until payment of the premium, whereas the policy was dated approximately one month prior to such payment. The grace clause recited: "If
this policy after being in force one full year from its date shall lapse for nonpayment of premium, the company will continue in force the insurance . . .
for a period of sixty days from the due date of such premium." The question
was whether the policy came into force on March 21 or on April 20, and, if
not until the latter date, whether or not it could be said to have lapsed before
April 20th of the ensuing year.
Held: 1. The terms of the policy were ambiguous as to the time
when the policy came into force, and, consequently, were ambiguous concerning whether or not it had been in force for one full year prior to March 21,
the date for payment of the premium.
2. Where the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous concerning
the date on which the policy will lapse for non-payment of premium, the
ambiguity should be resolved against the insurance company as the writer of
the doubtful document.-Judgment reversed.

DICTA
COMPENSATION-AWARD--REIEw-Lockard vs. Industrial
Commission et al.-No. 13096-Decided June 20, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.

WORKMEN'S

No error perceived in performance by District Court of instructions
previously issued in this case by this Court. Rules of law previously stated
in Industrial Commission et al vs. Lockard, 89 Colo. 428, 3 Pac. (2d) 416;
Industrial Commission vs. Lockard, 90 Colo. 333, 9 Pac. (2d) 286, reaffirmed.-Judgment affirmed.
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